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255 
Is the Political Question Doctrine 
Jurisdictional or Prudential? 
Ron Park* 
In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the family members of protestors 
killed or injured by bulldozers driven by the Israeli Defense Forces sued the 
manufacturer of the bulldozers in federal district court. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit after holding the issues nonjusticiable 
under the political question doctrine. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the political question doctrine was jurisdictional. As of this moment, 
only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly answered the question of whether the 
political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. The Supreme 
Court has not answered that question and no other Circuit Court of 
Appeals has done so either. 
This Note attempts to answer that question by making the factors 
articulated in the Supreme Court’s key opinion on the political question 
doctrine, Baker v. Carr, the central focus of its analysis. In doing so, this 
Note concludes that the political question doctrine is either jurisdictional or 
prudential depending on which factor is invoked. The first Baker factor is 
jurisdictional because it is the only factor that explicitly grounds itself in the 
Constitution. The remaining five Baker factors are prudential because they 
ask courts to consider things that are aligned with the Court’s prudential 
doctrines, such as ripeness.  
  
 
* The author would like to thank Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and the members of the UC Irvine Law 
Review Board for their invaluable guidance and support throughout the process of writing this Note. 
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In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the family members of protestors killed or injured 
by bulldozers driven by the Israeli Defense Forces sued the manufacturer of the 
bulldozers in federal district court.1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 
lawsuit after holding the issues to be political questions under the political question 
doctrine.2 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit also held that the political question doctrine 
was a jurisdictional doctrine.3 
This holding had important consequences. If a doctrine is jurisdictional, courts 
 
1. 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). 
2. Id. at 983 (“[W]e hold that plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the first Baker test.”). 
3. Id. at 982 (“We hold that if a case presents a political question, we lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to decide that question.”). 
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are obligated to address the issue before reaching the merits.4 Even if neither party 
raises the issue, courts can raise it sua sponte and look beyond the facts in the 
pleadings to determine the issue.5 Moreover, the issue cannot be forfeited or waived, 
so that at any moment in the litigation the issue can be raised and the case decided 
on that ground.6 
The consequences of declaring the political question doctrine jurisdictional are 
particularly high. Other justiciability doctrines address the parties to the case or the 
factual context of the proceedings. Standing ensures that the proper plaintiff is 
before the court.7 Mootness ensures that the court is resolving an actual case or 
controversy.8 Ripeness ensures that the court is adjudicating a case at the proper 
point in time.9 Each of these doctrines leaves open the possibility of later 
adjudication of the case once the proper plaintiff is found or the facts of the case 
are properly developed. The political question doctrine addresses the issue of the 
case itself.10 Once a question is deemed political, the court will never hear the case.11 
Moreover, in the case of Corrie, had the Ninth Circuit declared the political question 
doctrine to be prudential rather than jurisdictional, it would not have been able to 
look beyond the face of the complaint and the court may not have been able to 
conclude the way it did. 
As of this writing, only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly answered the question 
of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. In 1962, the 
 
4. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“[T]he first and fundamental 
question is that of jurisdiction . . . . This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even 
when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.” (quoting Great 
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900))). 
5. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 979 (“Only if the doctrine is jurisdictional may we look beyond the facts 
alleged in the complaint to decide whether this case presents a political question.”). 
6. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93 (stating that jurisdictional arguments “would have to be considered 
by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation—indeed, this Court would have to raise 
them sua sponte”). 
7. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In essence the question of standing is whether 
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”). See also 
Caprice L. Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U.L.REV. 569, 585 (2009) (describing 
standing doctrine as communicating “not you”). 
8. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 
(“[M]ootness represents the notion of ‘too late.’”). 
9. See Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corporations, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) (describing 
ripeness as “a question of timing”). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents 
the notion of ‘not yet.’”). 
10. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–425 (holding that 
whether a statute allowing Americans to list “Israel” as their place of birth on their passports must be 
given effect does not present a political question); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) 
(concluding that whether the Senate properly impeached a federal judge is a political question); Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that a challenge to legislative apportionment presents “no 
nonjusticiable ‘political question’”). 
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature 
political . . . can never be made in this court.”). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“The political 
question doctrine, however, if deemed applicable by the Court, means the Court will never hear the 
case.”). 
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Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, a case where it articulated the six factors a 
court must consider when applying the political question doctrine.12 But the 
Supreme Court did not answer in Baker or in any other case whether the political 
question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential, and no other Circuit Court of 
Appeals has explicitly done so either.13 In fact, the question recently came up in the 
Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Kansas Building Industry Workers Compensation 
Fund v. State.14 The Kansas Supreme Court did not explicitly answer the question, 
but the court’s analysis treated the doctrine as jurisdictional.15 
A number of scholars have attempted to fill the void: some have argued that 
the doctrine is jurisdictional,16 some have argued it is prudential,17 and some have 
even suggested the doctrine is a fiction.18 While a few of these articles have 
examined the Baker factors,19 none has made the factors the central focus of its 
analysis. This Note puts the Baker factors front and center in analyzing the question 
of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. Considering 
that all political questions are determined by applying the Baker factors, the question 
of whether the doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential should be determined based 
on an analysis of the factors themselves. 
This Note concludes that the political question doctrine is either jurisdictional 
or prudential depending on which factor is invoked. The first Baker factor is 
jurisdictional. The remaining five Baker factors are prudential. Part I of this Note 
provides an overview of the history of the political question doctrine and its current 
status in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Part II explains the implications of 
pronouncing the doctrine jurisdictional or prudential. Part III discusses the source 
 
12. 369 U.S. at 217. 
13. A few Circuits have suggested that the doctrine is jurisdictional. See Taylor v. Kellogg Brown 
& Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407 n.9 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the judiciary is “deprived of 
jurisdiction” when the political question doctrine is implicated); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 
(5th Cir. 2008) (stating that political questions are “nonjusticiable” because there is a difference between 
finding “no federal jurisdiction” versus declaring that a particular matter is “inappropriate for judicial 
resolution”); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (treating the political question 
doctrine as jurisdictional); 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (declaring the political question doctrine as “essentially a 
constitutional limitation on the courts”). However, some of these same Circuits have expressed doubts 
on the matter. Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 800 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court 
has not ruled on the matter one way or the other). Cf. Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (stressing the need to distinguish among a failure to state a claim, a claim that is not justiciable, 
and a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and pointing to the political question 
doctrine as an example of where the court has not been consistent about maintaining those distinctions). 
14. 359 P.3d 33, 41 (Kan. 2015). 
15. Id. at 42. 
16. See, e.g., Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
7–9 (1959). 
17. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183–92 (1962). 
18. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). 
19. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7, at 569; Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested 
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457 (2005). 
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of the political question doctrine and why it springs from separation of powers 
principles and not Article III of the Constitution. Part IV discusses each Baker factor 
and explains why the first is jurisdictional and the other five are prudential. Finally, 
Part V provides guidance on how courts are to apply the political question doctrine 
in light of this Note’s conclusion. 
I. WHAT IS THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE? 
A. Early History 
For much of U.S. history, there was no clearly defined political question 
doctrine. Instead, there were various issues that the Supreme Court thought were 
properly resolved by the political branches. For example, cases arising under the 
Guaranty Clause of the Constitution and cases relating to various aspects of foreign 
relations were held to be nonjusticiable political questions.20 
1. Republican Form of Government (Guaranty Clause) Cases 
Beginning with Luther v. Borden,21 the Court consistently held claims arising 
under the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution22 to be nonjusticiable political 
questions. In Luther v. Borden, the Court declared that it rested with Congress to 
decide whether a State government was a “republican form of government” as 
required by the Constitution, going so far as to state that Congress’s decision “could 
not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.”23 
The facts of Luther involved an action for trespass—an action that the 
defendants sought to justify by claiming they were acting under the authority of the 
lawful government of Rhode Island to suppress an insurrection.24 The question 
presented to the Court was whether the government under which the defendants 
claimed authority was in fact the lawful government of Rhode Island at the time of 
the alleged trespass.25 Although the Guaranty Clause did not explicitly identify 
Congress as the body to decide that question, the Court held that Congress was the 
proper authority because it was the branch that decides whether to admit the 
senators and representatives of a particular state into itself.26 
 
20. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
21. Id. 
22. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
23. 48 U.S. at 42. 
24. Id. at 34. 
25. Id. at 35. The Court also identified the question as a “very serious one” that would 
potentially nullify all manner of state action that occurred since the time when the state government 
allegedly ceased to exist. Id. at 38–39. This concern was reiterated and expanded upon in Pacific States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 141–42 (1911). However, in neither case did the Court explicitly 
hold that the question was nonjusticiable because of these concerns. 
26. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42. Although it did not do so, the Court could have pointed to Article 
IV, Section 3 of the Constitution to support its reasoning. Section 3 states that “[n]ew States may be 
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Claims brought under the Guaranty Clause since Luther have all been declared 
nonjusticiable without much additional comment on the subject.27 
2. Foreign Relations Cases 
The Court has also often held questions to be political in matters implicating 
foreign relations. In Doe v. Braden, the Court refused to consider the validity of 
certain provisions of a treaty, concluding that “the courts of justice have no right to 
annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the 
United States.”28 This was because the Constitution assigned the powers relating to 
foreign relations to the President, including the power to make treaties (provided 
two-thirds of the Senators concur).29 The Court also added that it would be 
“impossible” for the executive department to conduct foreign relations if “every 
court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who 
ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power . . . to make the 
engagements into which he entered.”30 
In Terlinden v. Ames, a case involving the continuing existence of a treaty, the 
Court declared that “the question whether power remains in a foreign State to carry 
out its treaty obligations is in its nature political and not judicial, and that the courts 
ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political department in that 
regard.”31 The Court cited back to Doe in support32 and elaborated that it could not 
declare the treaty terminated when both the governments of the United States and 
the German Empire asserted otherwise.33 Since these cases, the existence of treaties 
and the validity of their provisions have generally been held to be political 
questions.34 
Beyond treaties, the Court has also declared questions on sovereignty over a 
territory to be political.35 Sovereignty as a political question can be traced back to 
 
admitted by the Congress into this Union.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. This language supports the idea 
that Congress is also the guarantor of a republican form of government. 
27. See, e.g., State of Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. for Summit County, 281 
U.S. 74, 79–80 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); State of 
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915); 
Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256 (1913); Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 143; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 
 U.S. 548, 578 (1900). 
28. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902). 
32. Id. at 288–89. 
33. Id. at 289–90. 
34. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913) 
(holding that since the Executive Department waived any right to free itself from the obligations 
imposed by the treaty, the “plain duty” of the Court was to recognize those obligations), Cf. Franklin 
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that selecting a unit 
of conversion for limiting liability under the Warsaw Convention was a political question). 
35. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1918); Jones v. United States, 
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). 
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Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., where the Court rhetorically asked whether there 
could be “any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which is 
charged with our foreign relations . . . assumes a fact in regard to the sovereignty of 
any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department.”36 Although it did 
not explicitly refer to the Constitution, the Court’s reasoning channeled the 
document and the importance of separation of powers.37 The Court reasoned that 
if it held otherwise, cases would arise that would result in “irreconcilable 
difference[s] between the executive and judicial departments.”38 
However, not all foreign relations cases have been held to be political 
questions. For example, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Court held that there was no 
political question in a case involving a statute permitting Americans to list “Israel” 
as their place of birth on their passports.39 Similarly, in Japan Whaling Ass’n v. 
American Cetacean Society, the Court held that there was no political question in a case 
challenging the Secretary of Commerce’s decision not to certify Japan for harvesting 
whales in excess of International Whaling Commission quotas.40 In light of these 
cases, the Court has not been clear on exactly when a foreign relations issue is 
political and when it is not. 
B. Modern Formulation 
In part because of the haphazard manner in which issues had been declared 
political in the past, the Court attempted to formally define the scope of the political 
question doctrine in Baker v. Carr.41 The Court prefaced its analysis by noting that 
“the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it 
presents a political question.”42 Instead, courts are to analyze six factors to 
determine the existence of a political question43: 
1. Whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
2. Whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving the issue; 
3. Whether it is impossible to decide the issue without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 
4. Whether it is impossible for a court to undertake independent 
resolution of the issue without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; 
 
36. 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839). 
37. Id. (“It is enough to know, that in the exercise of [the President’s] constitutional functions, 
he has decided the question. Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is 
obligatory on the people and government of the Union.”). 
38. Id. 
39. 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–425 (2012). 
40. 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
41. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 217. 
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5. Whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to 
a political decision already made; or 
6. Whether there is a potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
Unless one of these factors is “inextricable from the case at bar,” there should be 
no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question.44 
After Baker, courts analyzing whether an issue is political have referred to at 
least one of these six factors in reaching their decisions.45 
C. The Supreme Court’s Political Questions Post-Baker 
Since Baker, the Supreme Court has held that a question is political in only two 
cases. In Nixon v. United States, a former federal judge asserted that the Senate had 
not properly “tried” his impeachment proceedings.46 Specifically, the judge claimed 
that the word “try” in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution47 precluded 
the Senate from delegating to a select committee the task of hearing the testimony 
of witnesses.48 The Court disagreed that “try” imposed any restriction on the Senate, 
noting that the specific requirements imposed on the impeachment process by the 
Constitution49 suggested that the Framers did not intend to impose additional 
requirements by implication.50 
Rather, the question was political because it was textually committed to the 
Senate.51 The Court focused on the word “sole” in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of 
the Constitution, which states that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”52 It reasoned that the Senate would not have “sole” authority over 
impeachments if courts could review its actions to determine whether it properly 
“tried” an impeached official.53 In addition, the Court noted the lack of judicially 
manageable standards for defining the word “try,”54 the need for finality in any 
impeachment decision,55 and the difficulty of fashioning adequate relief.56 
 
44. Id. 
45. E.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 
F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160. 
46. 506 U.S. at 228. 
47. “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3,  
cl. 6. 
48. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229. 
49. “The Members must be under oath, a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and the Chief 
Justice presides when the President is tried.” Id. at 230. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 228–33. 
52. Id. at 229. 
53. Id. at 231. 
54. Id. at 229–30. The difficulty of defining “try” was part of the reason why the issue was one 
textually committed to the Senate. Id. 
55. Id. at 236. 
56. Id. 
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In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court declared that political gerrymandering cases were 
nonjusticiable political questions because of a lack of judicially manageable 
standards, but only four justices joined the plurality opinion stating that such cases 
were always political.57 Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth vote, refused to agree 
that political gerrymandering cases were always nonjusticiable, stating that the lack 
of judicially manageable standards in the present did not foreclose the possibility of 
developing or discovering such standards in the future.58 
In no Supreme Court case has one of the other four factors, or even a 
combination of the other four factors, been found sufficient to make a question 
political without the presence of the first two factors. 
II. WHY IT MATTERS WHETHER THE DOCTRINE IS  
JURISDICTIONAL OR PRUDENTIAL 
As mentioned in the Introduction, if the political question doctrine is 
jurisdictional, courts are obligated to address the issue before reaching the merits.59 
Even if neither party raises the issue, courts can raise it sua sponte and, on motions 
to dismiss, look beyond the facts in the pleadings to decide the case.60 This is 
because jurisdictional issues are considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, whereas other issues are typically 
considered under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.61 Under Rule 12(b)(6), 
the analysis for dismissal is generally confined to a review of the complaint and its 
attachments.62 But under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider facts beyond the 
complaint.63 In addition, jurisdictional issues cannot be forfeited or waived, so at 
any moment in the litigation a party can raise the political question doctrine and the 
case can be decided on it.64 
These consequences are not mere hypotheticals. In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit against Caterpillar, a United States corporation, 
after first finding the political question doctrine a jurisdictional bar65 and then 
 
57. 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004). 
58. Id. at 313. 
59. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,  
177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)) (“[T]he first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction . . . . This 
question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and 
without respect to the relation of the parties to it.”). 
60. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 979 (“Only if the doctrine is jurisdictional may we look beyond the facts 
alleged in the complaint to decide whether this case presents a political question.”). 
61. See Lane, 529 F.3d at 557. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93 (stating that jurisdictional arguments “would have to be considered 
by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation—indeed, this Court would have to raise 
them sua sponte”). 
65. 503 F.3d at 981–82 (“[T]he political question doctrine . . . . . is at a bottom a jurisdictional 
limitation imposed on the courts . . . . We hold that if a case presents a political question, we lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to decide that question.”). 
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finding the issues presented by the plaintiffs to be political.66 The plaintiffs were 
individuals whose family members were killed or injured by the Israeli Defense 
Forces (“IDF”) as the IDF was demolishing homes in the Palestinian Territories 
using bulldozers manufactured by Caterpillar.67 The IDF ordered the bulldozers 
directly from Caterpillar, but the United States government paid for them.68 The 
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, an injunction directing 
Caterpillar to cease providing equipment to the IDF, and other relief under several 
claims.69 Because the Ninth Circuit considered the foreign relations issues 
inextricable from the plaintiffs’ claims, it held that the case presented a political 
question and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case.70 The Ninth Circuit 
was only able to reach this decision because a court can look beyond the face of the 
complaint when considering a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional issues.71 Had the 
Ninth Circuit declared the political question doctrine to be prudential, it would not 
have been able to look beyond the face of the complaint and the court may not have 
concluded the way it did. 
The consequences of declaring the political question doctrine jurisdictional are 
particularly high for future litigants and the development of the law as well. The 
other justiciability doctrines address the parties to the case or the factual context of 
the proceedings. Standing ensures that the proper plaintiff is before the court.72 
Mootness ensures that the court is resolving an actual case or controversy.73 
Ripeness ensures that the court is adjudicating a case at the proper point in time.74 
Each of these doctrines leaves open the possibility of later adjudication of the case 
once the proper plaintiff is found or the facts of the case are properly developed. 
The political question doctrine addresses the issue of the case itself.75 Once a 
question is deemed political, the court will never hear the case.76 
 
66. Id. at 983 (“[W]e hold that plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the first Baker test.”). 
67. Id. at 977. 
68. Id. at 978. 
69. Id. at 979. 
70. Id. at 983–84. 
71. Id. at 982 (“We may therefore look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether 
the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action under the political question doctrine.”). 
72. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”); see also Roberts, supra 
note 7, at 585 (describing standing doctrine as communicating “not you”). 
73. See Rice, 404 U.S. at 246; see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“[M]ootness represents the 
notion of ‘too late.’”). 
74. See Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 140 (describing ripeness as “a question of timing”); see also Roberts, 
supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”). 
75. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424–425 (holding that whether a statute allowing Americans 
to list “Israel” as their place of birth on their passports must be given effect does not present a political 
question); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226 (concluding that whether the Senate properly impeached a federal 
judge is a political question); Baker, 369 U.S. at 209 (holding that a challenge to legislative apportionment 
presents no political question). 
76. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political . . . can never be made 
in this court.”); see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“The political question doctrine, however, if deemed 
applicable by the Court, means the Court will never hear the case.”). 
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III. SOURCE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
A. The Difference Between the Political Question Doctrine  
and Other Justiciability Doctrines 
As discussed above, federal courts often consider other justiciability 
doctrines—such as standing, mootness, and ripeness—when considering a case. 
These doctrines trace their origins to Article III of the Constitution and its case-or-
controversy requirement.77 Although the political question doctrine has sometimes 
been associated with Article III,78 the doctrine’s history and development is distinct 
from Article III and the justiciability doctrines that spring forth from it. 
The early, pre-Baker cases that held one issue or another to be political never 
cited Article III or the case-or-controversy requirement as their reason. Rather, 
those cases typically referred to the separation of powers and the Constitution’s 
allocation of certain powers and responsibilities to either the legislative or executive 
branches of government.79 Cases that did not cite to separation of powers or the 
Constitution usually cited to other cases that ultimately traced their reasoning back 
to those sources.80 In at least one instance, the Court also called issues political by 
referring to notions of custom and legal tradition predating the establishment of the 
United States.81 However, even that justification implicitly relied on the idea that 
the issue was committed to another branch of government—the legislative or the 
executive—and not the judicial.82 
Another key difference between the political question doctrine and the other 
justiciability doctrines, such as standing, mootness, and ripeness, is that the latter 
doctrines seek to ensure that a federal court does not issue advisory opinions.83 
Deciding an issue when the plaintiff does not have standing or when the 
 
77. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of standing is 
an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”);  
Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 (quoting Liner v. Jafco Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (explaining that mootness 
originates from “the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial 
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy”); see also Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 138 (noting 
that ripeness involves, “in part, the existence of a live ‘Case or Controversy’”). 
78. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Allen v. Wright,  
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
79. E.g., Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 657; Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42; Williams, 38 U.S. at 420. 
80. E.g., Bryant, 281 U.S. at 79–80; Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 234; Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 
288–89. 
81. Jones, 137 U.S. at 212–16. 
82. Id. at 212 (noting that the determination of sovereignty is a “political question” that is 
determined by the “legislative and executive departments” and that this principle has “always been 
upheld by this court” and “is equally well settled in England”). 
83. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598 n.4 (“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts 
do not render advisory opinions . . . .”); St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943) (“A federal 
court is without power to decide moot questions or to give advisory opinions which cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants in the case before it.”); cf. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 631–32 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (explaining that ripeness, like mootness, serves to prevent a federal court from 
issuing advisory opinions). 
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controversy is moot results in an opinion that has no tangible effect.84 However, 
the political question doctrine does not share that same quality. Many of the cases 
where the Court declared a question political were cases where an actual decision 
on the merits would have had a tangible effect on the litigating parties.85 There was 
nothing “advisory” about a potential opinion. 
B. The Political Question Doctrine’s Source 
Rather, the political question doctrine arises from the structure of our federal 
government and the Constitution’s division of powers and responsibilities between 
the three branches of government.86 Its purpose is to ensure that courts do not 
usurp the powers of the legislative or executive branches.87 More generally, it is a 
recognition of the limitations of courts in answering every question that might be 
brought before them.88 Where courts held questions to be political, they determined 
that the issues were either committed to or better addressed by the executive or 
legislative branches.89 Where courts did not hold a question to be political, they 
determined that the issues were either committed to or properly addressed by the 
judicial branch.90 Without separation of powers—if the government were simply a 
single entity exercising all three powers—it would make little sense to ask whether 
a question was properly before a court. At its core, the doctrine seeks to answer the 
question, “Which branch is the right branch to resolve this issue?” 
Each of the six factors either directly or indirectly seeks to answer this 
question. 
1. How Factor One Preserves Separation of Powers 
The first factor explicitly looks for a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue” to a particular branch.91 This is the most straightforward 
of the factors. Courts are asked to look at the text of the Constitution and determine 
whether the document places resolution of the issue with either the legislative or 
executive branch rather than the judicial branch.92 The first factor therefore directly 
 
84. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (noting that without standing, a 
federal court’s “exercise of its power . . . would be gratuitous”); St. Pierre, 319 U.S. at 42 (deciding moot 
questions would not affect the rights of the litigants before the court). 
85. E.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (whether Senate properly “tried” an impeachment);  
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (whether the defendant trespassed); Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (whether the 
plaintiff could eject the defendant from certain lands). 
86. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function 
of the separation of powers.”). 
87. See id. at 210–011. 
88. See id. 
89. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224; Vieth, 541 U.S. 267. 
90. E.g., Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421; Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. 221. 
91. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
92. Id.; Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. Of course, the problem is that the text of the Constitution is 
silent about judicial review. So, by definition, it is also silent about precluding judicial review in specific 
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asks courts to consider the separation of powers and whether the question before 
the court is one that courts are properly empowered to answer. Although there may 
be different policy reasons behind a constitutional commitment of an issue to a 
particular political branch, the first factor does not ask courts to delve into such 
considerations nor does it require the commitment be justified in any way. The 
Framers may have desired one issue to be committed to a particular branch for one 
reason and preferred that another issue be committed to another branch for a 
completely different reason. Concerns of judicial competence or potential for 
embarrassment may have motivated these decisions, but the Supreme Court has 
never held that a court needs to determine the reason for a textual commitment. If 
these reasons were important, the Court in Baker could have articulated factor one 
to reflect this. It did not. Moreover, it has indicated that factor one standing alone 
is sufficient to find a political question.93 Therefore, the only common thread that 
ties different textual commitments together is the principle of separation of powers. 
2. How Factor Two Preserves Separation of Powers 
The second factor examines whether there are “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for resolving the issue.94 This factor makes the most sense 
when placed in the context of separation of powers: the lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards is a means by which a court might infer that 
the issue is beyond its jurisdiction and that it is more appropriately addressed by 
another branch.95 This is because federal courts have an obligation to decide cases 
properly before them.96 They are not supposed to decline to hear cases merely 
because the questions are exceedingly difficult or complicated.97 If the lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards were only meant to gauge a court’s 
ability to resolve an issue, it could be in direct tension with the court’s duty to decide 
a case. 
It is true that the second factor could be understood as simply asking whether 
a court has the means to decide an issue. After all, the factor does not ask whether 
another branch would have its own discoverable or manageable standards to decide 
the issue; it only asks whether such standards exist with respect to the judicial 
branch. However, the political question doctrine has not been described as simply 
an issue that a court is incompetent to decide: its description includes the notion 
that the question is more properly presented to the political branches of 
 
areas. But this does not change the fact that the first Baker factor asks courts to search for such a 
commitment in the Constitution’s text. 
93. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
94. Id. 
95. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (“[T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate 
political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the 
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”). 
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
97. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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government.98 In light of that description, it makes more sense to understand the 
lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards as implying that the political 
branches are better suited to deciding the issue. 
3. How Factor Three Preserves Separation of Powers 
The third factor asks whether, in order to answer the question at issue, an 
initial policy determination needs to be made that is clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion.99 This factor directly asks whether there is a preliminary policy decision 
that has to be made by another branch of government in order to decide the case. 
Examples of where such a policy decision may be necessary are where Congress has 
not yet passed legislation on an issue, where an agency has not yet promulgated any 
regulations on a topic,100 or where a treaty has not yet been ratified between 
countries. A court may not be comfortable adjudicating a case in such a situation 
because it may be concerned with legislating from the bench. But once there is a 
relevant statute, regulation, or treaty on point, then the court may be able to exercise 
its judicial powers to decide the issue. 
For example, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to decide issues arising in 
the context of foreign relations, but it has been more willing and more assertive in 
doing so if interpretation of a statute or a treaty is involved.101 In Medellin v. Texas, 
the Supreme Court held that an International Court of Justice decision was not 
binding on domestic courts based on the language of the U.N. Charter, Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, and the Optional Protocol Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention.102 The Court’s 
decision stands out because it was directly contrary to the position of the 
Executive,103 a branch that typically is granted great discretion in foreign affairs.104 
The Court’s willingness to enter this arena when a statute or treaty is involved 
makes sense. It may not be the province of the Court to decide whether an 
American can name “Israel” as his place of birth on his passport105 or whether to 
sanction a foreign country for violating international whaling quotas,106 but once 
 
98. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
100. Such a situation may also be dismissed on the basis of ripeness. However, where Congress 
or an agency has not spoken on an issue, there may be an open policy question that a federal court may 
not have discretion to answer. In fact, the lack of regulation itself may be a policy decision by an agency. 
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–34 (2007) (holding that EPA may refuse to promulgate 
regulations as long as it provides a “reasoned explanation”). 
101. Compare Terlinden, 184 U.S. 270 and Doe, 57 U.S. 635 with Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421; Japan 
Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. 221; and Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
102. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506–611. 
103. Id. at 503. 
104. See, e.g., id. at 523–24 (conceding that the President’s constitutional role ‘uniquely qualifies’ 
him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision); 
American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (noting the President’s “vast share of 
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations” and his “independent authority to act”). 
105. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424. 
106. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 223. 
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there is a statute or treaty on those issues, the Court is certainly empowered to 
decide whether or not the statute or treaty is constitutional or to interpret its 
language.107 The initial policy determination having been made, the Court is now 
able to bring its tools of interpretation to bear on the subject. 
4. How Factor Four Preserves Separation of Powers 
The fourth factor questions whether judicial action would be impossible 
without expressing “a lack of the respect due” a coordinate branch of 
government.108 There would be a lack of respect to another branch of government 
only if the judiciary were operating beyond its bounds and encroaching upon the 
powers of another branch. If a court were simply acting beyond its Article III 
limitations—for example, if a federal court were to decide a case involving only state 
issues and no diversity—it would not necessarily be disrespecting the legislative or 
executive branches. Neither Congress nor the Executive has the power to interpret 
the law; that is, to “say what the law is.”109 Therefore, a federal court deciding such 
a case would not be infringing on any powers assigned to those branches. The 
disrespected body in this example would be the States, and more specifically, the 
State judiciaries. And the political question doctrine has been understood to refer 
to those issues that the political branches of government must decide, not the 
judiciary.110 In this example, the issue is not necessarily beyond the province of 
courts to decide; rather, the wrong courts are deciding them. Therefore, factor four 
makes the most sense when “lack of the respect due” refers specifically to the 
encroachment of the judiciary on the powers of the legislative or executive 
branches. 
5. How Factor Five Preserves Separation of Powers 
The fifth factor asks whether there is an unusual need for “unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made” by another branch of government.111 
The suggestion is that in such a situation the judiciary should not interfere with the 
exercise of another branch’s powers. This factor only makes sense when understood 
as applying to the judicial branch vis-à-vis the other two branches. As far as the 
judicial branch itself is concerned, there is already an established hierarchy between 
the courts: the district courts adhere to the holdings of their respective circuit courts 
of appeals, and all courts adhere to the holdings of the Supreme Court on federal 
and constitutional law. More importantly, the political branches are the ones 
empowered to make “political” decisions.112 Since the judicial branch is prohibited 
 
107. See, e.g., id.; Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424. 
108. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”). 
110. See id. at 170. 
111. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
112. See id. 
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from making such decisions,113 at least theoretically there should be no situation 
calling a court to unquestioningly adhere to a political decision made by another 
court. 
Admittedly, court opinions are often motivated by political considerations and 
can be perceived as political decisions.114 However, even these opinions are couched 
in legal reasoning, and courts are limited by the constraints imposed by textual 
language and precedent.115 Even Bush v. Gore—considered a political decision by 
many people—was written as a legal opinion on an Equal Protection claim.116 Given 
the fact that even the most “political” court opinions are written with at least a 
veneer of legal analysis, there is a practical difficulty in determining which opinions 
are “political decisions” and which are “legal decisions.” 
Instead, the factor calling for “unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made” operates less problematically when it is considered specifically with 
regard to the legislative and executive branches. The business of the courts often 
involves interpreting and declaring the constitutionality of congressional or 
executive action. On some level, all congressional or executive actions are “political” 
decisions, and in exercising their powers, courts are often actively contesting these 
decisions and causing tension with the idea of separation of powers. In light of the 
ever-present danger of overreach and encroachment on the powers of the other 
branches, this factor ensures that courts take pause before plunging forward with a 
judicial decision. 
6. How Factor Six Preserves Separation of Powers 
The final factor asks whether judicial action would create a “potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
 
113. See id. 
114. E.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary 
Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001); Ledyard King, Regular People, Weighty Decision Put 
High Court in New Light, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2000 (quoting Michael Gerhardt as stating 
that “the court has transformed itself into a political institution” after Bush v. Gore); Jeffrey Rosen, 
Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18 (arguing that the Court after Bush v. Gore has “made it 
impossible for citizens of the United States to sustain any kind of faith in the rule of law”); David G. 
Savage & Henry Weinstein, Supreme Court Ruling: Right or Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A24 
(quoting Akhil Reed Amar as stating that “[m]any of us thought that courts do not act in an openly 
political fashion. So [Bush v. Gore] comes as a startling event that has shaken constitutional faith.”). 
115. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 372–73 (“The words of the constitution are sufficiently express . . . 
that these Courts may be thus controlled . . . .”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We give 
the words of a statute their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an indication Congress 
intended them to bear some different import.”) (quoting Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 
519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 
443 (2000) (“While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, particularly when we are interpreting 
the Constitution, even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have 
always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (“With respect to the equal protection question, we find a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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question.”117 As with the previous factors, this factor makes the most sense if it is 
concerned with the interaction of judicial decisions with the actions of the other 
two branches. “Potentiality of embarrassment” arises when there are conflicting 
pronouncements from two or all branches of government on an issue where it is 
not clear which branch has the ultimate authority. “Multifarious” pronouncements 
from various departments within the judicial branch do not present the same 
problem because when different courts or departments of the judicial branch 
pronounce conflicting opinions, the hierarchy of the judicial system makes clear 
whose pronouncements are controlling. Such clarity does not necessarily exist when 
two or three separate branches of government speak simultaneously on the same 
issue. In such a situation there is a real risk that a court may be operating outside of 
its constitutional bounds. As with factor five, this factor ensures that courts 
carefully consider the cases before them when making a judicial decision. 
Although a “potentiality of embarrassment” may exist when a court properly 
exercises its Article III powers, this cannot be what the Supreme Court had in mind 
with this factor. Given that courts are generally obligated to exercise jurisdiction 
where they have it,118 the mere potentiality of embarrassment cannot be enough to 
stay a court’s hand. In its history, the Court has decided cases that have brought it 
into conflict with the other branches of government in ways that could be 
considered as having created a “potentiality for embarrassment.”119 Nevertheless, 
the opinions that came out of those cases have been considered perfectly valid 
judicial decisions and no political question was found. Therefore, the “potentiality 
for embarrassment” cannot simply be from a judicial opinion that conflicts with a 
pronouncement of the legislative or executive branch. There must also be the added 
requirement that the ultimate authority on the matter is unclear—that a court is not 
only in conflict with another branch, but that it may have no business opining on 
the issue at all. 
IV. WHY THE DOCTRINE IS BOTH JURISDICTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL 
An analysis of the six Baker factors indicates that the best answer to the 
question of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential is 
that the first factor is jurisdictional and the other five factors are prudential. Such 
an answer is not unusual. Other justiciability doctrines also contain mixed 
jurisdictional and prudential elements. For example, standing has jurisdictional 
 
117. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
118. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404. 
119. E.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the 
National Industrial Recovery Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (voiding the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (voiding legislation regulating 
the coal industry); Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (voiding a New York minimum wage 
law for women and children). These decisions ultimately led to the proposal of the Judicial Procedures 
Reform Bill of 1937, which was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s effort to add additional Justices 
to the Supreme Court. See Michael E. Parrish, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND 
LEGACY 24 (2002). 
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elements (injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability) as well as prudential 
elements (zone-of-interest and third-party standing).120 Ripeness is “drawn both 
from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for 
refusing to exercise jurisdiction.”121 Therefore, making a similar division within the 
political question doctrine would not be at all novel or contrary to how the Court 
has treated other justiciability doctrines. 
A. The Jurisdictional Component 
The first Baker factor is jurisdictional. It asks whether there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department.”122 Of all the Baker factors, this is the only one that explicitly grounds 
itself in the Constitution.123 As the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, no 
court, including the Supreme Court, is free to flout its provisions.124 If the first 
factor were prudential, then a court could exercise discretion in invoking it in cases 
where the first factor is at issue. This would make no sense. It would essentially 
mean that the judicial branch could consider an issue textually committed to the 
executive or legislative branch by the Constitution—a violation of separation of 
powers. 
Of course, the Constitution’s text is not always explicit on which matters are 
committed to which branches.125 Therefore, some degree of textual interpretation 
is required for courts to decide whether the first factor has been implicated.126 
However, this does not mean that courts are free to arbitrarily decide which issues 
are assigned to which branches.127 They are still confined to the text of the 
Constitution in conducting their analyses. 
While this may be an unsatisfying answer, the Article III justiciability doctrines 
exhibit similar problems. The elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact, 
traceability, and redressability—cannot be found in the text of Article III or 
anywhere else in the Constitution. Rather, these elements have been developed by 
the Supreme Court over a series of opinions; they give effect to the requirement 
 
120. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
121. National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dept. of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting 
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). 
122. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
123. Id. 
124. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of 
the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
125. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring) (“Although Baker directs the Court to search 
for a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’ of such responsibility, there are few, if any, 
explicit and unequivocal instances in the Constitution of this sort of textual commitment.”). 
126. Id. (“The courts therefore are usually left to infer the presence of a political question from 
the text and structure of the Constitution.”). 
127. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (“‘The judicial Power’ created by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution 
is not whatever judges choose to do . . . .”). 
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that Article III courts adjudicate actual “Cases” or “Controversies” and prevent 
them from issuing advisory opinions.128 That many more cases turn on the issue of 
standing has led to a much more detailed and nuanced development of the standing 
doctrine, but there is no reason why the political question doctrine would not be 
amenable to similar development through case law. Moreover, the courts have used 
traditional tools of textual and historical interpretation to determine whether certain 
issues have been textually committed to a particular branch of government.129 
There may be occasions where the traditional tools do not work. The Court 
has sometimes stated that the issue of whether a matter is textually committed to 
another branch of government is intertwined with the issue of whether judicially 
manageable standards exist for its resolution.130 However, this should not be taken 
to mean that factors one and two are the same or that factor two is also 
jurisdictional. It may be the case that an issue is textually committed to another 
branch of government, even though judicially manageable standards exist.131 
Nonetheless, a federal court would not have jurisdiction over the matter. 
Conversely, a case may be textually committed to the judiciary (or the Constitution 
may be silent or neutral on the issue), but judicially manageable standards may prove 
elusive.132 In that case, a court may have jurisdiction, but for prudential reasons the 
wiser course of action may be to abstain from judgment.133 
In a situation where the traditional tools of interpretation fail to serve a federal 
court in its interpretation of the Constitution’s text, and there is no other tool to 
serve in their stead, it would be better to say that the Constitution is either silent or 
neutral on the issue. It is unlikely that the Framers would have made the 
commitment of a particular issue so difficult to discern that a court is unable to 
determine the Constitution’s command one way or the other.134 
B. The Prudential Components 
The other five Baker factors are prudential. There is an argument that these 
other factors also serve to preserve the explicit separation of powers articulated in 
the Constitution. However, this would make the five factors duplicative of the first 
factor, which explicitly asks whether an issue has been committed by the 
 
128. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102–04; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–62; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 154–456 (1990); Allen, 468 U.S. at 750–052; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–501. 
129. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–231, 233–36 (analyzing the use and definition of the word 
“sole” and the history behind the drafting of impeachment provisions in the Constitution); Powell, 395 
U.S. at 521–47 (going into extensive detail of the history behind qualifications for House membership). 
130. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
131. Id. at 245–51 (White, J., concurring) (explaining why the definition of the word “try” is 
“hardly so elusive as the majority would have it”). 
132. See, e.g., Vieth, 451 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
133. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
134. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905) (“It must also be remembered 
that the framers of the Constitution were . . . practical men . . . putting into form the government they 
were creating, and prescribing, in language clear and intelligible, the powers that government was to 
take.”). 
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Constitution to the legislative or executive branches of government. Given the 
careful consideration that goes into the drafting of Supreme Court opinions and the 
development of tests that will be used by courts throughout the country, it makes 
more sense for the five factors to address separation of powers considerations 
beyond those explicitly stated within the Constitution.135 
These considerations include questions of judicial competence to address an 
issue before the court and concerns regarding the prudent exercise of judicial 
review.136 The second and third factors ask whether the case before the court calls 
for decision-making beyond the court’s competence.137 If a court is incompetent to 
decide an issue, then perhaps the issue is better committed to one of the other 
branches. The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors ask whether judicial action would 
result in disrespect of or embarrassment to the other branches of government or to 
the government as a whole.138 Such a result may imply that the court is encroaching 
on an area that is committed to another branch. 
1. Prudential Factors Two and Three: Decision-Making Beyond a Court’s Competence 
The second and third Baker factors are:139 
2. Whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving the issue. 
3. Whether it is impossible to decide the issue without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion. 
Justice Sotomayor expressed in a concurring opinion that these factors address 
the competence of courts to decide an issue.140 The judicial power created by Article 
III of the Constitution is not “whatever judges choose to do but rather the power 
to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts.”141 Justice 
Sotomayor took this to mean “the application of some manageable and cognizable 
standard within the competence of the Judiciary to ascertain and employ to the facts 
of a concrete case.”142 If a court has no standard by which to adjudicate a dispute, 
or cannot resolve a dispute in the absence of a policy determination charged to a 
political branch, the suit is beyond Article III review.143 This is not to say that courts 
are incapable of interpreting or applying somewhat ambiguous standards using 
 
135. It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court would intend to create redundant factors when 
even Supreme Court dicta can carry great weight in lower courts’ analyses. See United States v. Oakar, 
111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 6 F.3d 856, 
861 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993)) (“Carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically 
dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.”). 
136. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
140. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
141. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. 
142. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
143. Id. 
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traditional tools of statutory or constitutional interpretation.144 But where such tools 
are completely useless in helping a court decide an issue and no other tool can be 
ascertained, the best decision from the court may be to abstain from judgment.145 
In contrast with factor one, prudential considerations motivate factors two 
and three. On its face, the lack of judicially manageable standards does not address 
whether a court has proper jurisdiction over an issue, but whether a court has the 
competence to decide an issue. It is a consideration that is completely separate from 
whether an issue is properly before the court. The impossibility of making a decision 
without making a preliminary policy choice also addresses whether the court is 
capable of making a decision, not whether an issue is properly within the court’s 
jurisdiction. One might imagine that once the proper branch of government makes 
a policy decision, the court may then proceed to decide the dispute if it still exists. 
This latter consideration has much in common with the doctrine of prudential 
ripeness, where a court determines that the timing of a dispute counsels against 
hearing the case.146 
While these two factors seek to preserve separation of powers, they cannot 
originate from the Constitution unless they are to be redundant in light of the first 
factor. If there is a constitutional prohibition against judicial review, it would be 
identified by a court applying the first factor. Instead, these two factors help identify 
a political question when the Constitution is silent or neutral on the issue. 
The cases where the second and third factors alone identify a political question 
should be few. Courts have a duty to resolve a controversy within their traditional 
competence and proper jurisdiction and cannot refuse simply because the question 
is difficult.147 Indeed, courts have consistently managed to craft tests or other 
modes of analysis to decide difficult and novel questions brought before it.148 That 
these tests may have flaws or ambiguities in their application are not sufficient 
reasons to declare that no judicially discoverable or manageable standard exists. 
Many of the tests that are currently used by federal courts suffer from imperfections 




146. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”). 
147. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404. 
148. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(establishing level of deference to agency constructions of statutes); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of 
Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (establishing a balancing test for determining “fundamental fairness” 
under the Due Process Clause); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (recognizing that 
intermediate scrutiny applies to Equal Protection Clause claims alleging discrimination on the basis of 
sex or illegitimacy). 
149. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, 
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 209 (1989) (criticizing the Batson framework for 
eliminating race-based peremptory strikes); Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the 
Constitution: Finding a Standard That Works, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1174 (2007) (criticizing the Anderson/
Burdick test for deciding voting disenfranchisement claims); Laura L. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling 
Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933 (1993) (criticizing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 
and its effect on the doctrine of standing). 
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legitimacy. Declaring that there are no judicially discoverable or manageable 
standards to judge the issue or that reaching a decision is impossible without making 
a preliminary policy choice should occur only when there are essentially no judicial 
standards by which a court can proceed or where a preliminary policy is demanded 
by the circumstances. 
2. Prudential Factors Four, Five, and Six: Disrespect and Embarrassment Counseling 
Against Judicial Review 
The final three Baker factors are:150 
4. Whether it is impossible for a court to undertake 
independent resolution of the issue without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government. 
5. Whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made. 
6. Whether there is a potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
Each of these factors amounts to prudential considerations. Factor four 
implies that when judicial action does not express the proper amount of respect due 
the other two branches of government there may be an overstepping of judicial 
authority. Factor five is similarly concerned with overstepping judicial boundaries 
and conflicting with a political decision made by another branch of government. 
Factor six is concerned about courts potentially embarrassing a branch of 
government or the government as a whole by addressing a question that might need 
to be answered by another branch of government. 
Each of these factors should be construed as an additional means of 
safeguarding the principle of separation of powers, but they do not make much 
sense as constitutional limitations. With respect to factor four, it is not clear when 
a court expresses a “lack of respect” towards another branch of government. 
Federal courts do not express a “lack of respect” for the other branches of 
government when they interpret the law or consider the constitutionality of 
government action.151 Their constitutionally mandated responsibility is to do exactly 
that.152 For a court to find such a “lack of respect,” it must necessarily look beyond 
the simple exercise of its powers. Where there is a lack of respect, there may be an 
overstepping of judicial authority. 
Regarding factor five, courts are not supposed to make or otherwise involve 
themselves in political decisions.153 To the extent that courts are making political 
 
150. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
151. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the 
province and of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
152. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
153. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political . . . can never be 
made in this court.”). 
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decisions or going beyond their constitutionally enumerated powers, factor one 
already addresses those situations. Therefore, factor five refers to those political 
decisions made by the other two branches and asks courts to consider whether this 
is an occasion where there is an unusual need to adhere to those decisions. Where 
courts rule against those decisions, they may be overstepping their bounds. 
Finally, factor six requires courts to pause when confronted with an issue 
where their jurisdiction is unclear. Typically, ruling on the constitutionality of a 
statute or otherwise interpreting the law, rather than adding to a cacophony of 
pronouncements from the other branches of government, acts to resolve any 
dispute and finally settle the matter in question.154 Therefore, the mere exercise of 
Article III powers cannot qualify as one of the “multifarious” pronouncements that 
factor six refers to. Instead, factor six asks courts to consider whether a judicial 
opinion would not ultimately resolve a dispute and thereby result in embarrassment 
from conflicting pronouncements between branches. If it might, again the courts 
may be overstepping their bounds. 
Taken together, the last three factors are considerations a court should take 
into account to ensure that it exercises its powers in a manner that is sensitive to 
the principle of separation of powers between the three branches of government. 
There should be very few cases where such considerations rise to a level where 
courts should abstain from deciding an issue. The mere fact that a court is called 
upon to resolve the constitutionality of an act of another branch of government is 
not enough.155 And a court cannot refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because a 
decision has “significant” political overtones or affects the country’s foreign 
relations in general.156 Courts have a duty to resolve a controversy within their 
traditional competence and proper jurisdiction157 and cannot refuse simply because 
“the question is difficult, the consequences weighty, or [the decision] might conflict 
with the policy preferences of the political branches.”158 
Instances where the courts have declined to exercise their powers for the 
reasons expressed in the last three factors are very few. Historically, they have been 
limited to cases questioning the good faith with which another branch attests to the 
 
154. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
155. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390–091 (1990) (“If it were, every judicial 
resolution of a constitutional challenge to a congressional enactment would be impermissible.”). 
156. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230. 
157. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404 (“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should 
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature 
may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by 
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we 
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the 
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can 
do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.”). 
158. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404. 
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authenticity of its internal acts.159 Although the Court has suggested that situations 
where there is an unusual need for finality to the action of a particular branch,160 or 
where there is an acute risk of “embarrassment of our government abroad or grave 
disturbance at home,” might be sufficient to render a question political,161 there is 
no case where the Court has actually held so on those grounds alone. 
Moreover, the last three Baker factors find common ground with the doctrine 
of prudential ripeness under which considerations of justiciability or comity lead 
courts to abstain from deciding questions whose initial resolution is better 
postponed to a later time.162 As Justice Sotomayor expressed with respect to the 
political question doctrine, “it may be appropriate for courts to stay their hand in 
cases implicating delicate questions concerning the distribution of political authority 
between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable, and incapable of 
resolution by the political process.”163 
As its name suggests, prudential ripeness is considered a prudential, not 
jurisdictional, doctrine.164 And as with the political question doctrine, the court is 
not necessarily issuing an advisory opinion when ruling on an issue that might be 
unripe for review. Rather, considerations of whether a plaintiff has exhausted all 
administrative remedies165 or whether the factual record is sufficiently developed 
determine whether a court will declare an issue ripe.166 The determination is that the 
timing of review is not proper.167 A similar concern animates the last three Baker 
factors. 
V. HOW TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE UNDER THIS FRAMEWORK 
Concluding that the first factor of the political question doctrine is 
jurisdictional and the other five factors are prudential means that issues that have 
been held political based solely on the prudential Baker factors are not forever 
barred from adjudication. The factual context surrounding a particular case that 
justifies abstention may not exist in another case addressing the same issue. For 
 
159. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672–73 (1892); see also Sherman v. Story, 
30 Cal. 253, 276 (1866); Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 526–627 (1886). 
160. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–455 (1939). 
161. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226. 
162. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Nat’l Park 
Hosp. Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 808; Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998); Lujan 
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 892 (1990). 
163. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1433 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
164. Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013) (noting that the Court has 
recognized that “prudential ripeness” is not jurisdictional). 
165. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (stating that one of the “basic 
rationale[s]” of the ripeness doctrine is “to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 
parties”), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
166. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891 (stating that a regulation is not ordinarily “ripe” for judicial review 
under the APA until “the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, 
and its factual components fleshed out”). 
167. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”). 
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example, the final three Baker factors examine the context in which a judicial 
decision is being made and not the issue before the court. Asking whether a court 
is exhibiting a lack of respect due a coordinate branch, is faced with an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or is creating a 
potentiality for embarrassment questions the wisdom of the court exercising its 
power in a specific context, rather than the power or ability of the court to make a 
decision on the issue. Therefore, the same issue raised in a completely different 
context does not necessarily implicate the last three factors. The unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to the political decision might no longer exist or the 
potentiality for embarrassment might no longer be present. 
Even a political question based on the second and third Baker factors should 
not result in an issue being forever barred from adjudication. Judicially manageable 
standards may not exist presently, but could be discovered or developed in the 
future.168 And an issue that requires an initial policy determination that is clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion may in fact return before the court after that policy 
determination is made. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth suggests that some 
issues that are considered political now might lose that label later.169 
The only political questions that are forever withheld from judicial 
consideration are those that have been textually committed in the Constitution to 
another branch of government. Barring a constitutional amendment, federal courts 
have no discretion to decide issues that are constitutionally committed to the 
executive or legislative branches.170 
Courts reviewing cases involving questions that have been held political would 
then have to determine whether the question is political on jurisdictional or 
prudential grounds. Traditional tools of judicial analysis should be sufficient to 
make this determination. If an earlier case held that an issue was political based on 
the first factor, or some combination of the first factor and the other five factors, 
then it remains political. For example, a question regarding the proper process of 
impeachment in the Senate would likely remain political if raised again because the 
Court in Nixon held that the issue was textually committed to the Senate.171 On the 
other hand, if it had been held political based on some combination of the other 
five factors, then a court should evaluate whether those factors are still implicated 
in the case before it. For example, political gerrymandering cases may not necessarily 
be political if raised in a future case because judicially manageable standards of 
review may be discovered or developed that overcome the concerns expressed by 
the Court in Vieth.172 A court would have to evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
 
168. See Vieth, 451 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That no such standard has emerged 
in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.”). 
169. See id. 
170. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . . 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
171. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–33. 
172. See Vieth, 451 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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whether any earlier holding was reached on jurisdictional or prudential grounds, and 
then rule accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The political question doctrine seeks to preserve an important foundational 
principle of our system of government: the separation of powers. To more clearly 
define the scope of the doctrine, the Supreme Court laid out six factors for 
consideration when deciding any political question issue. However, the Court failed 
to specify whether this doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. Although cases have 
been decided without explicitly answering that question, the consequences of an 
answer are significant and both courts and litigators deserve clarity on the issue. An 
analysis of the six Baker factors shows that only the first factor poses a jurisdictional 
question, and the remaining five consist of only prudential considerations. Courts 
should conduct their analyses in accordance with these distinctions, and any prior 
decisions finding political questions should be evaluated in light of which factors 
motivated the courts’ conclusions in those cases. In this way, the political question 
doctrine will be better applied when it is invoked by litigants and courts, and the six 
Baker factors will be applied with proper consideration of how each one relates to 
the goal of preserving the separation of powers in our federal government. 
 
